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Summary
While undergoing treatment in the psychiatric depart-
ment, A.C., a 40-year-old white male, who had arrived in
the casualty department complaining of an uncontrol-
lable anxiety attack and in a state of fluctuating con-
sciousness, was found to be suffering from a psy-
chopathological condition characterized by pathologi-
cal lying, gambling, compulsive restlessness, a long
clinical history of chronic back pain, with multiple inva-
sive diagnostic investigations and repeated surgery for
disc hernia with relative complications, culminating in
the fitment of a fixed neurostimulator, a slow-discharge
morphine pump and the patient being granted a full dis-
ability pension. The continual increases in the doses of
morphine suggested a tendency towards drug addic-
tion. 
After providing a brief overview of the historical back-
ground and current concepts relating to the relation-
ship between factitious disorders, malingering and
hysteria, the authors discuss the differential diagnosis
of the case, suggesting a diagnosis of Münchausen
syndrome (the hypothesis best supported by the clini-
cal evidence). This diagnosis, although the subject of
much academic debate, is, unfortunately, still not fre-
quently encountered in the medical literature, with the
result that even today it has a strong clinical, relational
and social impact.
KEY WORDS: chronic back pain, factitious disorders, malingering,
Münchausen syndrome, recurrent surgery.
Introduction
Factitious disorders are characterized by voluntary be-
havioural patterns intended to produce both physical
and psychological symptoms that simulate various types
of illness. This behaviour has no apparent advantage for
the individual concerned, other than allowing him or her
to play the sick role.
Over the years, these disorders have been given vari-
ous names, such as Lasthénie de Ferjol syndrome (1),
“patomimie”, and “dermatomimie”, but the most well
known by far is Münchausen syndrome (2). Although
Asher (3) applied this name to just one specific form of
factitious disorder, characterized by pathological lying
(pseudologia fantastica), wandering from hospital to
hospital, and simulation (conscious or unconscious) of
illness, in recent years it has become, in practice, syn-
onymous with the much broader term, factitious disor-
ders. Since these patients’ case histories are often fab-
rications, their symptoms feigned, and the details of their
lives and illnesses pure invention, the problem of deceit
in disorders of this kind has always been a focus of con-
siderable attention. “Simulate”, coming from the Latin
simulo, derived from similis meaning “to make similar,
imitate, assume the aspect of, feign, pretend”, means
manifesting feelings that, in reality, one does not feel (4).
Strictly speaking, therefore, factitious patients simulate,
but the question of whether or not they can be consid-
ered deliberate simulators, or malingerers (in relation to
what is meant by normal versus pathological simulation)
remains open.
The spectrum of factitious disorders has been defined
on the basis of a limited number of descriptions of indi-
vidual clinical cases, and set out in a nosographic clas-
sification (5). The question of the connection between
hysteria and simulation has been discussed at length,
with factitious disorders first attributed to malingering,
and then to hysteria. Later, they were placed on a con-
tinuum with these disorders (6) (Table I, over).
Even as early as 1908, Dieulafoy (7) described a patient
with gangrenous wounds that had been self-inflicted us-
ing caustic soda. He was convinced that this new
pathology was a particular form of simulation, distinct
from somatic hysterical symptoms. Whereas Corradini,
in 1962 (8), came to the conclusion that the psy-
chopathological traits of the pantomimics bore a funda-
mentally hysterical hallmark, Bursten (9) underlined
their distinctive elements with respect to hysteria, while
both Spiro (10) and Cramer (11) emphasized the fact
that the relationship between hysteria, factitious disor-
ders and malingering was poorly defined, in that the clin-
ical cases observed, including those of factitious disor-
ders, all revealed traits typical of hysteria. It is by no
means easy to separate deceit from hysteria, of which
malingering is frequently a component. Other authors
(12,13) excluded an overlap between factitious disor-
ders and hysteria on account of the voluntary intent with
which factitious patients inflict wounds on themselves.
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Others, such as Prasad and Oswald (14), formed opin-
ions relating to the course of the illness, suggesting that
the subject’s awareness that he is producing his own
symptoms can vary over a period of time, rendering the
boundary between hysterical conversion, feigned illness
and malingering, in practice, somewhat blurred. Subse-
quently, some authors set factitious disorders apart from
hysteria, seeing them as closer to malingering (15); oth-
ers still put forward ideas that were the exact opposite of
this interpretation, reviving the idea of a similarity be-
tween factitious disorders and hysteria, based on the
fact that both these disorders have highly dramatic pre-
sentations (16).
A precise classification of factitious disorders was pro-
vided in DSM-III-R (17), and confirmed in DSM-IV (18)
and DSM-IV-TR (19) (Table II), and it was based prima-
rily on the evidence that, in malingering, a patient has
voluntary control over his symptoms, which is exercised
for external gain, easily identifiable in his current situa-
tion (for example, he may be seeking to avoid military
service or work, to solve financial problems, or to obtain
a reduction of a prison sentence, or compensation for
damages). 
These behavioural symptoms cease in the presence of
real life or health risks, or of a low cost-benefit ratio, pro-
viding the malingerer is capable of making this type of
evaluation. In one case of this kind, which received
widespread publicity in Italy (2001), a young factory
worker from the Veneto region procured, with the help of
a friend, the amputation of a lower limb in order to re-
ceive compensation but subsequently bled to death.
Factitious disorders, on the other hand, involve inten-
tional behaviour whose unconscious objective is to allow
the subject to play the sick role, a role characterized by
compulsiveness and by an inability, on the part of the
patient, to stop producing the symptoms. 
Hysterical disorders, no longer part of the DSM as a sin-
gle nosographic denomination but now classified else-
where under “conversion disorders” and “somatoform
disorders”, are involuntary and nurture intentions which
are entirely unconscious.
Malingering is classified as a “condition that can be the
object of clinical attention” or at least represents a type
of adaptive behaviour, observed for example in situa-
tions of deportation or war imprisonment, without consti-
tuting a real psychiatric diagnosis (19).
The aspect of external gain as a discriminating factor in
the diagnosis of malingering, favoured by the American
authors of the DSM and others who have done an in-
depth study into factitious disorders (20), has by no
means met with unanimous agreement. Taking as his
starting point the observation of clinical cases of patients
suffering from trauma who, presenting genuine conse-
quences both physical and psychological, honestly seek
compensation, David Enoch (21) (Table III) suggested
that, in Europe, the real key to the problem of the differ-
ence between malingering and factitious disorders lies
in the state of consciousness/awareness, and of inten-
tionality/volition. It is incorrect to differentiate conditions
purely on the basis of final motivation, on the grounds
that “malingering is conscious manipulation and there-
fore not an illness, while factitious disorder is uncon-
sciously motivated and is equivalent to hysterical disor-
ders or conversion disorders and consequently is a real
illness” (21).
It is also interesting to observe how, in terms of poten-
tially fluctuating or openly modified states of conscious-
ness, some authors (22,23) (Table IV), when discussing
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Table I - Historical background.
Dieulafoy 1908 (7) hysteria ≠ factitious disorders = malingering
Attolini 1986 (15)
Corradini 1962 (8) hysteria = factitious disorders ≠ malingering
Py and Consoly 1989 (16)
Bursten 1965 (9) hysteria ≠ factitious disorders ≠ malingering
Cheng and Hummel 1978 (12) 
Carney 1980 (13)
Spiro 1968 (10) hysteria = factitious disorders = malingering
Cramer 1971 (11) 
Prasad and Oswald 1985 (14)
The bibliographic references appear in parentheses.
Table II - From past debate to current concepts.
Somatoform disorders Factitious disorders Conditions that may be a focus 
of clinical attention
Conversion disorders 300.11 Factitious disorders 300.xx Malingering V65.2
Unconsciously motivated Unconsciously motivated Consciously motivated by external incentive
Intrapsychic need to mantain the sick role
Source: DSM-IV-TR (19).
the concepts of pseudodementia, an illness character-
ized by transitory clinical symptoms similar to those
present in organic dementia such as cognitive deficit
and attention and memory disorders, affective flattening
and psychomotor inertia, include, in the differential diag-
noses, other pathologies which could be responsible for
dementia-like cognitive dysfunctions. These include
hysteria, with varying levels of lucidity of consciousness
(Pseudemence Isterique de Wernicke), conversion dis-
orders, factitious disorders (Münchausen syndrome),
Ganser’s syndrome, and the feigning of mental illness.
At the beginning of the last century, military doctors and
psychiatrists defined the psychological consequences of
cerebral trauma as an ideogenous “traumatic pseudode-
mentia” (24). This ideogenous reaction was subse-
quently recognized as “unconscious deception” (25), or,
by present day concepts, as factitious disorder as op-
posed to malingering, on the basis of these patients’ in-
ternalization both of the presumed damage and of the
question of related external benefit (compensation). The
relationship with war trauma and with accidents in gen-
eral presents similarities with Ganser’s syndrome and
with Wernicke’s pseudodementia. Ganser’s syndrome,
characterized by approximate answers, altered con-
sciousness and dream-like or twilight states, somatic or
conversion symptoms, and a chronologically direct rela-
tionship with physical or emotional trauma, could corre-
spond in the DSM-III-R (17) to factitious disorder with
predominantly psychological symptoms or to factitious
disorder with predominantly physical symptoms, on ac-
count of the frequent conversion symptoms.
Case report
A.C., a 40-year-old male, arrived at a casualty depart-
ment one Monday morning complaining of uncontrol-
lable anxiety and requesting a psychiatric examination.
He had been on his way to work after taking his son to
school, but had not been able to face it and had instead
decided to go to the hospital. None of his family knew of
his decision. A.C. had been married for more than 10
years. He had a 7-year-old son; his mother, a widow,
lived alone but was in close contact with A.C. and his
family. He also had a brother, who led his own life. His
father was dead. A.C.’s decision to seek psychiatric help
was a last resort in a situation which had become emo-
tionally untenable: in recent years he had contracted
very heavy gambling debts, which his family had discov-
ered only a few months earlier. Although, despite their
understandable feelings of anger and shame, they had
decided to stand by him and help him, he complained of
insomnia and periods of depression, saying he felt con-
fused, distressed and as though he were on a road with
no hope of return. Due to the uncertainty and apparent
gravity of the clinical picture, the consultant decided to
authorize hospitalization, which A.C. willingly accepted
even though he was worried about the reactions of his
family, whom he feared would not agree with the deci-
sion. On somatic examination of the patient, scars were
noticed on his back and abdomen, together with a neu-
rostimulator and a fixed slow-discharge spinal morphine
pump. What subsequently emerged was a long history
of repeated surgical operations (more than 10) on the
spinal column for a slipped disc. These had begun ten
years earlier and had ended, following a series of so-
phisticated surgical interventions performed in an at-
tempt to control the pain, with the insertion of a fixed
analgesic system. The detailed clinical history was re-
constructed later after consulting the clinical notes from
the hospital archives that documented the patient’s nu-
merous hospital admittances over a period of thirteen
years.
The patient’s history, apart from the usual childhood ill-
nesses, included tonsillectomy at the age of 3 years, a
left internal meniscectomy at the age of 17 years, and
the removal of an intra-articular cyst from the left knee
at the age of 27 years. The patient’s hospitalizations,
mainly in the neurosurgical and orthopaedics depart-
ments, became more frequent around the age of 30. Ini-
tially the patient presented symptoms of a bilateral lum-
bar sciatalgia due to a right median and paramedian
lumbar disc hernia, documented on CT scan, for which
an operation, for removal of the hernia, was carried out
with interlaminary access, apparently resolving the
pain. A further acute phase of the symptoms, caused by
a recurrence of hernia in the fourth right lumbar disc,
necessitated a further operation. Following the opera-
tion, the patient was prescribed a semi-rigid corset,
which partially alleviated the pain. Two years later, a fur-
ther operation was performed to remove a recurrent
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Source: ref.s 22,23,28,29.
hernia at L4-L5 and a year later, at the age of 33, follow-
ing a sudden attack of right lumbar sciatalgia, A.C.
again underwent an operation on L4-L5 for stenosis due
to scarring as a result of the previous disc hernia re-
moval. Two months later he was admitted yet again to
the orthopaedics department with a further attack of
lumbar sciatalgia, but electromyography of the right low-
er limb and a CT scan of the lumbar-sacral spine
showed no signs of acute neurological deficit or a recur-
rence of the hernia. A year later, after a further, similar
episode, MR imaging of the lumbar-sacral spine
showed a recurrence of the disc hernia at L4-L5. While
the patient was waiting to undergo an operation the use
of a plaster cast was prescribed. Subsequently, the pa-
tient underwent L4-L5 arthrodesis using the Diapason
system. In spite of this stabilizing operation, A.C. contin-
ued to complain of pain, but lumbar-sacral CT scan
showed no evidence of recurrent hernias in the follow-
ing periods of hospitalization one year and three years
later (at the ages of 35 and 37). Most recently, in an at-
tempt to eliminate the persistent lumbar sciatalgia, a
posterior-lateral L4-L5 arthrodesis in abstraction with a
Steffer plate had been carried out. A Boston-Brau type
cast was then applied to correct posture when erect and
seated. Due to yet another acute pain attack A.C. un-
derwent a lumbar-sacral CT scan with contrast, injec-
tions of anaesthetic, and sacculoradiculography, and
arachnoiditis and epidural inflammation were found to
be present. A temporary epidural spinal dorsolumbar
neurostimulator was therefore fitted. An appointment
was then made with a pain therapy centre for the follow
up of the patient and a further hospitalization was
scheduled for one month later for the fitment of a fixed
ITREL 3 neurostimulator in a subcutaneous pocket in
the left abdomen. At the age of 38, A.C. was admitted to
the neurosurgical department with a diagnosis of failed
back syndrome and, after myelo-CT and myelography,
epidural block anaesthesia was carried out to no effect.
After the administration of a placebo there was a
marked improvement in the pain symptoms, and mor-
phine also had a positive effect. Meanwhile, pain thera-
pists were contacted to fit a fixed slow-discharge mor-
phine pump. Further hospitalizations ensued for neu-
rostimulator and pump maintenance.
A.C. was officially recognized as disabled and accord-
ingly took a part-time job as a disabled person. Howev-
er, by the time of his admittance to the psychiatric de-
partment at the age of 41, he already had a long record
of absences from work, which he had kept hidden from
his family. At this point, a relational and existential situa-
tion became apparent, in which there was a tendency
towards difficulty in controlling impulses, compulsive
gambling, claustrophobic anxiety and an intolerable,
confused mental state, described by the patient himself,
in which he felt that he was losing control both of himself
and of his thoughts. Symptoms of depression and per-
sonality disorder were noted and a diagnosis of Mün-
chausen syndrome was proposed as compatible with
the psychopathological picture and the clinical-surgical
case history. 
A.C.’s wife and mother were openly disapproving when
they were informed of his admittance to hospital (on the
day he turned up at the casualty department seeking
psychiatric help) and of the fact that the doctors were
convinced he was suffering from a serious emotional
disorder. The mother, especially, had been tolerant of
the somatic illness and the resulting clinical procedures
but could not accept a psychological disturbance on ac-
count of the shame involved in her son being admitted
to a psychiatric department. In spite of their daily pres-
ence on the ward and constant complaints about the lies
A.C. had told them, outside the hospital environment
they mirrored A.C.’s behaviour by lying to his son, justi-
fying his absence from home as ‘being away on busi-
ness’ and continually asking to talk to the specialists
without A.C. being present.
A.C.’s hospital stay was, however, brief and not long
enough to allow either an in-depth analysis of his case,
or, more importantly, the planning of an effective course
of therapy. After a slight improvement in his state of
anxiety, A.C., in response to his family’s incessant de-
mands (and probably also because he had heard that
his doctors intended to consult with the orthopaedic
specialists and neurosurgeons at the hospital where he
had been treated), discharged himself. It was at this
point that his past history was reconstructed from his
clinical records. In the same way, further information,
regarding his subsequent progress and admissions (to
the orthopaedics and neurosurgical departments and,
as a day hospital inpatient, to the general surgical de-
partment for the refilling of the morphine pump and fit-
ting of new neurostimulators), was also obtained from
hospital records.
Discussion 
It is by no means difficult to imagine the disease course
corresponding to much of the evidence reported in this
paper. The clinical history, the symptoms, both at the
time of the patient’s admission to the psychiatric depart-
ment and subsequently, and the carer and family dy-
namics all pointed to a diagnosis of Münchausen syn-
drome (factitious disorders). From this perspective, we
may consider the repeated surgical operations (only the
first two had really been necessary, due to a neurologi-
cal deficit of foot dorsiflexion), which had been actively
desired by the patient, as had recourse to invasive diag-
nostic techniques and treatments; we may also consid-
er the patient’s refusal to recognize/accept his psy-
chopathology, which was characterized by pathological
lying, gambling, morphine addiction, and fluctuating
consciousness, and his compulsive actions and dis-
charging of himself from hospital for fear of being found
out. This diagnosis, which, in this particular clinical case,
was supported by other descriptions of patients who had
undergone multiple operations (26,27), would appear to
be more likely than the other possible diagnoses, dis-
cussed below.
Somatic illness
A purely somatic illness was initially present, but appears
to have been aggravated by the patient’s intolerance of
pain, and to have been the focus of an excessive num-
ber of surgical and clinical procedures and instrumental
diagnostic investigations. The patient’s very definite pref-
erences as regards his therapy are probably what in-
duced the team in charge of his case to opt for surgery,
diagnostic investigations and invasive anti-pain tech-
C. Callegari et al.
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niques in spite of the fact that: (i) very few recognized re-
habilitation programmes had been implemented, either
by the clinicians or the surgeons (which would be the
normal approach in such a case, particularly in view of
the young age of the patient); (ii) an objective neurologi-
cal deficit of dorsiflexion of the foot (in regression after
the operations) was present only in the case of the first
two operations for disc hernia; (iii) the patient continued
to manifest symptoms of the deficit together with a slight
limp after the first six surgical operations but none of
these symptoms was supported by any evidence of or-
ganic damage on CT scan or MR imaging; (iv) the con-
tinual increases in the dose of morphine released by the
pump suggested a tendency towards drug addiction. 
As a result, the patient underwent: surgical operations to
remove adhesions (an approach questioned even by
neurosurgeons themselves, since clinical experience
shows that adhesions always recur); an apparently ex-
cessive number of procedures relating to the implanta-
tion of the epidural neurostimulator for pain therapy, due
to the suspected diagnosis of arachnitis-epiduritis; and
an excessive number of surgical operations, diagnostic
and therapeutic.
Malingering 
All things considered, the diagnostic criteria for malin-
gering, aimed at some sort of social services compensa-
tion (although this was, in fact, obtained in the form of a
disability pension) did not appear to satisfy the complex-
ity of the symptoms, clinical, somatic and psychological,
that this patient presented.
Factitious disorder
Although factitious disorder corresponded to the pa-
tient’s symptoms more than the other possible diag-
noses, it is still a highly ambiguous diagnostic label that
does not denote an absolute correspondence either to a
somatic or to a psychological pathology. It is a provoca-
tive and even scandalous diagnostic category because
it is inherently paradoxical. Indeed it is a diagnosis:
– that contradicts the very idea of a nosography that al-
lows you to identify and make distinctions;
– that clinicians can apply only in the awareness that it
is useless to unmask the factitious patient because the
unveiling of his illness has no therapeutic function at all
(28);
– that reflects the impossibility of following a normal di-
agnostic and therapeutic course.
In conclusion, there are many interesting elements relat-
ing to the evolution of this patient’s picture. The mental
state of intolerable confusion that the patient reported
and attempted to describe, in which he had the impres-
sion of losing control of himself and of his own thoughts,
might appear, to an external observer, to denote a state
of fluctuating consciousness (reflected in both neuro-
physiological and in purely psychological alterations, in
the qualitative parameters of identity and reality, and al-
so in the disassociation that results in a self that is both
actor and observer at the same time). In this dimension,
all traces of the, by now remote, clinical history, the ill-
ness and life of the patient, the motivations, conscious
or unconscious, that have led him to become a chronic
patient, are lost. He is officially recognized as disabled
and compensated for his disability, but this gives him no
feelings of satisfaction, and he is still eager to play the
role of the incurable patient.
Indeed, the lies, the pretence and the malingering that
recur in continuation in this patient’s case history and in
the history of his interpersonal relations, even in the very
presentation of his confused mental state, should, strict-
ly speaking, be totally inadmissible to the sufferer. Yet he
seems, consciously, to lie continually and, unconscious-
ly, to sham with his family, his GP and other medical
care providers, his colleagues and friends, in a way that
is beyond all limits of normality and, which, despite the
continual condemnation of his fraudulent and deceitful
behaviour, becomes a relationship style that is shared
(too readily and dangerously) by his family, and in which
the truth, whatever it may be, is lost or replaced by a
true/false reality which is acceptable to everyone.
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